And let's preface our discussion of this account with a definition. Let's say that objects x and y coincide at time tjust in case (1) x is not y, and (2) the place wholly occupied at t by the whole of x is numerically the same as the place wholly occupied at t by the whole of y. As here defined, coincidence is an irreflexive relationship. We will use 'coextension' and its cognates for the corresponding reflexive relationship.
To supporters of the standard account of cases such as Statue and Piece (i.e. cases in which an object satisfying one sortal is coextensive with an object satisfying a sortal associated with different persistence conditions), coincidence is a commonplace. (Pun intended.) Copper statues coincide with pieces of copper. Tailless cats coincide with 'pusses'. Persons may coincide with bodies. And ordinary physical objects of all kinds coincide with aggregates of molecules.
To many, the present writer included, the standard account is uncongenial. Peter IOn theories that allow only one object to a place, differences in sort are readily explained. The difference in sort between a tree and a mouse is attributable to the difference in their qualities. In the extraordinary case in which the objects differing in sort are qualitatively identical (as in Peter Simons' case of genuine bills and counterfeit bills ([14], p. 205) or the case of a statue and a qualitatively identical object produced by a volcano), the difference in sort is explained by differences in the manner or circumstances of their origin or, perhaps, by other differences in their histories. (Below we will see why such differences could not account for the alleged difference in sort between Statue and Piece.) 5 Perhaps it will be suggested that objects satisfy the (substance) sortals they satisfy precisely in virtue of being identified under those sortals. Such a suggestion could be understood in either of two ways: (1) An object satisfies no sortal whatsoever unless it has been (or will be?) identified, in which case it satisfies whichever sortal it was (or will be) identified under. (2) An object owes not just its sort, but Let's begin with answer (1), that Statue and Piece differ in sort as a result of differences in their histories. The problem with this answer emerges when we ask how it is possible for Statue and Piece to differ in their histories, given that Statue and Piece are (at present) coextensive. In the present context, to say that objects x and y differ in their histories is to say that for some past or future time, x and y differ with respect to the properties (of certain types) that they exemplify at that time. This, in turn, is to say that for some past or future time and for some property (of one of those types), it is true of x or y, but not of both, that it is numerically identical across time with an object exemplifying that property at that time. But now what could account for a difference in the cross-time identities of Statue and Piece? The two are composed of just the same atoms. And since they are coextensive, any object spatiotemporally continuous with one is spatiotemporally continuous with the other. If one but not the other is identical with a certain past or future object, the only apparent explanation for this is that one but not the other is like that object in sort. In short, historical differences between Statue and Piece could be explained only by reference to the very difference they are themselves supposed to explain: the alleged difference in sort.
Perhaps it will be suggested that differences in the cross-time identities of Statue and Piece would require no explanation. It is arguable that cross-time identities cannot be analysed in terms of other, more basic relationships.6 And it might be thought to follow that cross-time identities are ungrounded, that their relata satisfy no conditions that are (non-trivially) sufficient for, and hence its very existence, to being identified under a certain sortal. As for (1), it is inconsistent with the sortal essentialism that underlies the standard account. As for (2), it must be distinguished from the familiar anti-realist (or 'internal realist') thesis that objects have no existence independently of conceptual schemes. According to (2), objects depend for their existence not just upon the existence of conceivers, but upon being individually identified under (sortal) concepts. I will simply ignore this possibility, partly because of its implausibility, partly because of the infeasibility of entering here into realist/anti-realist controversies, but mostly because there is no indication that this radical thesis is or would be accepted by those who support the standard account. Wiggins, the most influential exponent of the account, emphatically rejects even the familiar forms of anti-realism, both with respect to sort ([18], pp. 136-8) and with respect to existence (pp. 138-42) . Having rejected answers (1) and (2), and seeing no other plausible explanation for the alleged difference in sort between Statue and Piece, I conclude that Statue and Piece do not differ in 7 For a statement of the four-worlds paradox and a discussion of some possible solutions, see [12] , pp. 229-52. For an explanation of how cross-time identities can be grounded if objects lack temporal parts, see [5] , pp. 184-5.
SAre an object's being of a certain sort and its having certain persistence conditions the same thing? If they are, then neither can explain the other. And answer (2) must be rejected.
9 One could deny this, if one were prepared to accept that cross-world identities are (absolutely) ungrounded. But as noted two paragraphs back, I know of no one who is prepared to accept this proposition. (It should not be confused with the much weaker thesis advanced by Adams [1] : that the cross-world identities of material objects are never grounded in purely qualitative conditions.) sort and that the standard account must therefore be rejected. Elsewhere I will offer a novel alternative.,0.
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